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SMART METERS AS A CATALYST FOR PRIVACY LAW
Matthew Tokson *
Smart utility meters raise several puzzling legal questions—and answering them
can help point the way toward the future of Fourth Amendment and civil privacy law.
This Essay addresses two such issues: use restrictions on collected data, and voluntary
data disclosure.
First, more than any other current technology, smart meters compel the
development of use restrictions on collected data. The benefits of smart meters are
potentially enormous, such that categorically prohibiting public utilities from collecting
smart meter data is likely beyond the pale. 1 Yet allowing law enforcement agents to
obtain detailed or intimate data about the home without a warrant seems equally
unacceptable. Smart meters are the clearest example yet of the need for robust
restrictions on how the government can use data it has collected. Government entities
are already collecting personal information about citizens for a variety of legitimate,
non-law enforcement purposes. 2 Limiting access to such data will often be the best
practical means to ensure citizen privacy in the era of big data.
Second, smart meter privacy is threatened by legal regimes that emphasize users’
voluntary disclosure of their energy use data. While many customers have little choice
but to use smart meters, numerous others do have a choice, and detailed energy
surveillance likely entails customers voluntarily choosing to link their smart meters with
smart home devices and appliances. Under some doctrinal approaches, voluntarily
disclosed data would be wholly unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. 3 Courts and
scholars would do well to move beyond existing paradigms of voluntary choice and
inescapable surveillance, lest the most sensitive forms of smart meter data remain
unprotected.
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2 See, e.g., Kugler and Hurley, supra note 1, at 453; Jennifer D. Oliva, Prescription-Drug Policing: The Right to
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Matthew Kugler and Meredith Hurley’s sophisticated analysis of smart meter
privacy provides a valuable roadmap for scholars and lawmakers as they confront the
novel questions posed by smart meters. 4 This Essay seeks to expand on Kugler and
Hurley’s analysis of use restrictions and to reimagine their approach to voluntary data
disclosure.

I.

THE ERA OF USE RESTRICTIONS BEGINS
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, scholars have debated whether the

law should regulate how law enforcement agents use government data, in addition to
regulating how they collect data. 5 There are two central controversies in this literature:
first, whether use restrictions are effective at protecting privacy; 6 and second, assuming
they are effective, whether they should be imposed primarily by courts or legislatures.7
Some have argued that use restrictions can effectively protect privacy in a variety of
contexts, 8 while others contend that such restrictions will be difficult to implement and
may weaken restrictions on data collection. 9 Likewise, some scholars favor leaving use
restrictions to legislatures, arguing that Fourth Amendment doctrine as applied by
courts is a poor fit for such granular restrictions; 10 others have proposed that Fourth
Amendment law can provide a coherent foundation for use restrictions. 11
There are strong arguments on both sides of these issues. 12 But for better or worse,
events have largely overtaken these debates and may soon render them irrelevant. The

Kugler and Hurley, supra note 1, at 452. Kugler and Hurley’s detailed and insightful account of smart meter
privacy also touches on important issues like the public/private distinction in Fourth Amendment law, the
FTC’s strengths and weaknesses as a privacy regulator, data mining regulations for private companies, and
the meaning of the landmark decision Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
5 E.g., Wayne A. Logan, Policing Police Access to Criminal Justice Data, 104 IOWA L. REV. 619, 625 (2019);
Emily Berman, When Database Queries Are Fourth Amendment Searches, 102 MINN. L. REV. 577, 580 (2017); Ric
Simmons, The Mirage of Use Restrictions, 96 N.C. L. REV. 133, 179 (2017); Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers:
Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 64 (2014); Orin S. Kerr, Use Restrictions and the Future
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https://www.brookings.edu/research/use-restrictions-and-the-future-of-surveillance-law/
[https://perma.cc/4SNH-XVSE]; William J. Stuntz, Local Policing after the Terror, 111 Yale L.J. 2137, 2160
(2002).
6 Several scholars have argued compellingly in favor of use restrictions, see, e.g., Joh, supra note 5, at 64; Kerr,
supra note 5, at 8, while others have offered strong arguments that use restrictions are likely to be ineffective,
Simmons, supra note 5, at 180–191.
7 Compare Kerr, supra note 5, at 8, with Logan, supra note 5, at 664;
8 E.g., Kerr, supra note 5, at 8; Joh, supra note 5, at 64.
9 Simmons, supra note 5, at 180–191.
10 Simmons, supra note 5, at 180–82; Kerr, supra note 5, at 9–10.
11 E.g., Logan, supra note 5, at 664; Berman, supra note 5, at 580.
12 See supra notes 6–11.
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era of use restrictions has already begun. Smart utility meters are the perfect illustration
of this phenomenon. As Kugler and Hurley demonstrate, the benefits of smart meters
are potentially massive. 13 Smart meters are necessary for efficient energy grid
management, which may be indispensable for addressing climate change and furthering
prosperity in general. 14 Prohibiting public or quasi-public utilities from using smart
meters is likely not viable as a policy choice under current circumstances. 15 At the same
time, there are substantial and growing privacy risks from smart meter data, which is
capable of disclosing detailed information about the activities of people inside a home. 16
For example, smart meters can reveal to the government what devices a resident is using,
the time and duration of use, and potentially more. 17 Permitting law enforcement agents
unfettered access to details about a person’s activities inside their home disregards core
constitutional values. 18
In addressing this dilemma, courts and lawmakers have begun to rely on use
restrictions that permit government utilities to obtain sensitive data about homeowners
but prohibit the dissemination of such data to other agencies without a court order. 19
And these use restrictions go far beyond familiar limitations on the scope of warrants. 20
In Naperville Smart Meter v. City of Naperville, the Seventh Circuit upheld a town’s use of
mandatory smart meters on the ground that their data collection was “unrelated to law
enforcement” and was otherwise reasonable. 21 Importantly, the court noted that its
holding depended on the particular circumstances of the case, and that “our conclusion
might change if the data was more easily accessible to law enforcement or other city
officials outside the utility.” 22 This statement, and the court’s repeated emphasis on the
Kugler and Hurley, supra note 1, at 460–69.
Kugler and Hurley, supra note 1, at 457. Smart meters also help utilities address outages and generate
sufficient power, and help consumers save money and adopt energy-efficient behaviors. Id. at 464–66.
15 See id; See generally IPCC, SPECIAL REPORT ON THE OCEAN AND CRYOSPHERE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE, (2019)
(explaining the immediate effects of climate change and the urgency of its mitigation).
16 Kugler and Hurley, supra note 1, at 469-70.
17 Kugler and Hurley, supra note 1, at 469–72 (discussing the possibility that smart meters may become
integrated with smart home devices such as Amazon Echo, smart lights and thermostats, or smart TVs).
18 Kugler and Hurley, supra note 1, at 469–74.
19 Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 528 (7th Cir. 2018) (finding that
Naperville’s data collection did not violate the Fourth Amendment specifically because of this use
restriction).
20 See, e.g., California v. Riley, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014) (prohibiting police from searching a cell phone’s
contents under the traditional search incident to arrest exception); United States v. Sedaghaty, 728 F.3d 885,
911 (9th Cir. 2013) (requiring an additional warrant to permit a further search of computers seized for a
different search); United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 464-65 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that police exceeded
the scope of a private search when they examined disks that the private searchers did not examine).
21 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 529. See also id. at 528 (“Critically, Naperville conducts the search with no
prosecutorial intent. Employees of the city’s public utility—not law enforcement—collect and review the
data.”).
22 Id. at 529.
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non-law enforcement use of the data, strongly indicates that it would reverse course if
the city started sharing data with law enforcement. The Seventh Circuit functionally
imposed a Fourth Amendment use restriction on the data. Going forward, in the Seventh
Circuit, smart meter data collection is only reasonable under the Fourth Amendment so
long as it is walled off from law enforcement uses. 23
Another recent case suggests that courts may also directly impose restrictions on
law enforcement requests for data held by other government agencies. This would
extend the principle of Naperville beyond smart utility programs, providing Fourth
Amendment protections for a variety of non-law-enforcement government databases. In
United States v. Hasbajrami, the Second Circuit ruled that the Fourth Amendment applies
to law enforcement uses of data collected and stored for national security purposes. 24
FBI agents had queried a database of emails and other communications with foreign
nationals collected by the NSA under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. 25
The Second Circuit remanded to the district court to determine whether this additional
use was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 26 It noted that the enormity of the
communications database and the sensitive nature of the data compelled constitutional
restrictions on use, lest the program turn into a limitless source of domestic
surveillance. 27 If law enforcement could query such a vast database without any
constitutional check, it would be akin to a general warrant allowing the government to
search wherever and whomever it pleases—the precise evil that the Fourth Amendment
was designed to prevent. 28 The court indicated that domestic law enforcement queries
of the NSA’s vast foreign intelligence database would likely raise serious constitutional
concerns. 29
The Hasbajrami opinion leaned heavily on recent Supreme Court cases expanding
the scope of the Fourth Amendment to cover digital databases held by third parties and
imposing limits on searching cell phones lawfully seized during an arrest. 30 Indeed, the
recent expansion of the scope of the Fourth Amendment in Carpenter v. United States is

See id. at 528–29.
United States v. Hasbajrami, 945 F.3d 641, 670 (2d Cir. 2019) (“[Q]uerying that stored data does have
important Fourth Amendment implications, and those implications counsel in favor of considering
querying a separate Fourth Amendment event that, in itself, must be reasonable. Our reasoning is based on
three considerations.”).
25 Id. at 645.
26 Id. at 671.
27 Id.
28 Id. (“If such a vast body of information is simply stored in a database, available for review by request …
the program begins to look more like a dragnet, and a query more like a general warrant.”); Kugler and
Hurley, supra note 1, at 482.
29 Hasbajrami, 945 F.3d at 672.
30 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
23
24
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essential to the rise of use restrictions. 31 Prior to Carpenter, most information disclosed to
a third party was wholly unprotected by the Fourth Amendment, making the imposition
of use restrictions impossible in most cases. 32 But today, such information may be
protected by the Fourth Amendment, and both Naperville and Hasbajrami rely on this
expanded protection in their analyses. 33
Finally, the fact that courts have begun to apply Fourth Amendment use restrictions
on collected data does not mean that there is no place for statutory use restrictions.
Indeed, Naperville city regulations providing that its public energy utility would not
provide customer data to law enforcement officers without a search warrant reassured
the Seventh Circuit that Naperville’s approach was constitutional. 34 And Kugler and
Hurley’s proposed Energy Use Privacy Act would, among its many appealing
provisions, limit access to smart meter utility data to the utility itself. 35 Further, Fourth
Amendment use restrictions are likely to work best when they impose simple, brightline restrictions on use, such as prohibiting all law enforcement uses while permitting
all non-law-enforcement uses. 36 More sophisticated or nuanced use restrictions are better
suited for implementation by statute. 37 Likewise, restrictions on the dissemination of
smart meter data to private entities will require statutes that can protect consumer
privacy against commercial exploitation. 38
Yet regardless of whether statutory restrictions might be optimal, the extremely
slow pace of federal privacy legislation and the weak or absent nature of state statutes
thus far likely means that courts will have to develop use restrictions in Fourth
Amendment law—or fail to restrain government database use at all. 39 The most pressing
question involving use restrictions is no longer whether they will occur or who will
implement them, but rather how courts and (eventually) lawmakers can best apply them
to novel information-gathering technologies. Smart meters provide a pathmarking
example of a technology that compels use restrictions on gathered data—and the brief

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
Kerr, supra note 5, at 9–10.
33 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 527; Hasbajrami, 945 F.3d at 671–72.
34 Kugler and Hurley, supra note 1, at 494 (describing Naperville’s “Smart Grid Customer Bill of Rights” law,
which prohibits the provision of customer data to law enforcement without a court order).
35 Kugler and Hurley, supra note 1, at 504.
36 Another possibility would be limiting all uses to the collecting agency and prohibiting access from any
other agency.
37 See Kerr, supra note 5, at 10 (noting that legislatures have advantages over courts in developing detailed
use restrictions).
38 Kugler & Hurley, supra note 1, at 496.
39 See Kugler & Hurley supra note 1, at 505 (discussing the weak protections offered by those few state
statutes that exist); Matthew Tokson, The Normative Fourth Amendment, 104 MINN. L. REV. 741, 797 (2019);
Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 139, 192–93 (2016).
31
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history of smart meter implementation suggests that courts and lawmakers can
successfully impose such restrictions.

II. INESCAPABLE SURVEILLANCE AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
Traditionally, the Fourth Amendment has granted no protection to information that
a person shares with third parties. 40 The Supreme Court recently reshaped this “thirdparty doctrine” in Carpenter v. United States, which established that people retain a
Fourth Amendment right in their cell phone location data even though it is revealed to
others. 41 Carpenter is a notably ambiguous case, and its precise meaning going forward
is contested. 42 Some scholars believe that it is the first step in a revolutionary expansion
of Fourth Amendment protection to new forms of digital data, 43 while others consider it
a more limited exception to the third-party doctrine for certain types of surveillance. 44
One issue central to this debate is the importance of voluntary disclosure, i.e.
whether an individual chooses to disclose their data to a third party or whether such
disclosure is largely inescapable. In the wake of Carpenter, many scholars and lower
courts have endorsed voluntary disclosure as an important factor in determining Fourth
Amendment rights. 45 A few have gone further and argued that information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties is never protected. 46 Such an approach would narrowly limit

Kugler & Hurley supra note 1, at 476; Matthew Tokson, Inescapable Surveillance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 409,
415–18 (2021).
41 Tokson, supra note 40, at 409.
42 See, e.g., Matthew Tokson, The Aftermath of Carpenter: An Empirical Study of Fourth Amendment Law, 2018–
2021, 136 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022); Lior Strahilevitz & Matthew Tokson, Ten Thoughts on Today’s
Blockbuster Fourth Amendment Decision — Carpenter v. United States, CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 22, 2018),
https://web.archive.org/web/20180721111755/https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2018/06/tenthoughts-on-todays-blockbuster-fourth-amendment-decision-carpenter-v-united-states.html.
[https://perma.cc/Y94X-PTXR]; Orin S. Kerr, First Thoughts on Carpenter v. United States, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (June 22, 2018), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/06/22/first-thoughts-on-carpenter-v-united-sta/
(discussing the many important questions left open by the Carpenter opinion); Kugler & Hurley, supra note
1, at 496 (“Carpenter … raised questions about dozens of issues and it may be years before courts give clear
answers to any of them.”).
43 Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J. OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 357, 386 (2019).
44 Kerr, supra note 3, at 17.
45 Ohm, supra note 43, at 385; Kerr, supra note 3, at 20–22. United States v. Sigouin, No. 9:19-CR-80136, 2019
WL 7372958 at *7 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 31, 2019); United States v. Diggs, 385 F. Supp. 3d 648, 660–61 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
But see Tokson, supra note 40, at 425–39.
46 See Kerr, supra note 3, at 20–22; United States v. Shipton, No. 0:18-CR-202-PJS-KMM, 2019 WL 5330928, at
*14 (D. Minn. Sept. 11, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-CR-0202 (PJS/KMM), 2019 WL
5305573 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2019) (leaning heavily on voluntariness in holding that peer-to-peer file sharing
is unprotected by the Fourth Amendment).
40
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the scope of Carpenter and leave a wide variety of personal information unprotected by
the Fourth Amendment. 47
Kugler and Hurley largely adopt this restrictive view, arguing that it “appear[s] to
be inherent in the language of Carpenter.” 48 Thus an individual seeking Fourth
Amendment protection would have to show that the collection of their data was
unavoidable and not the result of a voluntary choice. 49 Fortunately, smart meter data
often passes this test. 50 Residents whose utilities adopt smart meters may have no choice
but to use such meters in their homes. 51 Those residents cannot be said to have
voluntarily disclosed their data to a third party; the collection of their data was largely
inescapable. 52
But in a world where only involuntarily disclosed data is protected, even smart
meter data is vulnerable, and existing Fourth Amendment protections for such data can
be easily circumvented. The more closely one examines the smart meter context, the less
confident one becomes that such data would be protected under an “involuntary
disclosure only” paradigm.
Not all smart meter installations are mandatory. Many states and municipalities
permit their users to opt out of smart meters, some for no fee. 53 In the numerous
jurisdictions with opt outs and non-exorbitant fees, the disclosure of one’s smart meter
data to the government is a voluntary choice—and this intimate data might therefore be
unprotected. 54 While homeowners in Portland (where opting out is prohibitively
expensive 55) would enjoy privacy in their smart meter data, homeowners in Los Angeles

Tokson, supra note 40, at 413–15. See also, e.g., United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2019) (the use
of a messaging app was voluntary and therefore data associated with its use was unprotected); United States
v. Kidd, 394 F. Supp. 3d 357, 358–59, 365–66, (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (voice-over-internet-protocol service was not
ubiquitous or inescapable and therefore was likely not protected by the Fourth Amendment).
48 Kugler & Hurley, supra note 1, at 486–87. This conclusion is controversial, and the importance of
involuntary disclosure to Carpenter’s outcome is unclear. See Matthew Tokson, The Next Wave of Fourth
Amendment Challenges After Carpenter, 59 WASHBURN L. J. 1, 5 (2020). The Court’s discussion of the
voluntariness issue takes up a single paragraph in a long opinion that mostly focuses on the “detailed,
encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled” nature of cell phone surveillance and its potential negative effects
on citizen privacy. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216, 2211–12, 2215–19 (2018).
49 Kugler & Hurley, supra note 1, 486–87 (citing Kerr, supra note 3, at 3).
50 Id. at 486.
51 Id. at 453.
52 Id. at 487.
53 See Smart Meter Opt-Out Options and Fees, ELECTRONIC SILENT SPRING,
http://www.electronicsilentspring.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/SMART-METER-OPTOUTOPTIONS-AND-FEES-by-STATE.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU2A-5AZY] (last updated Nov.
6, 2016).
54 See Kerr, supra note 3, at 20-22.
55 I refer here to Portland, Oregon, where, as of late 2016, opt out fees were $254 plus an ongoing monthly
surcharge of $51. See supra note 53.
47
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(where opting out is free) may not. 56 Nor are those Los Angeles homeowners likely to
opt out, because default rules exert a powerful influence and opting out is rare in
virtually every consumer context. 57 Of course, if the vast majority of people do adopt
smart meters, that may demonstrate their societal ubiquity and make it more likely that
they will be protected under Carpenter. 58 But the precise meaning of Carpenter remains
unclear, and a consumer’s voluntary adoption of smart meters in the face of easy optouts might be enough to preclude Fourth Amendment protection. 59 Governments
seeking to obtain smart meter data could provide low-fee opt outs, potentially
eliminating the involuntary nature of smart meter data disclosure.
Further, the most concerning forms of smart meter data collection likely involve
voluntary consumer choices, which would again eliminate Fourth Amendment
protection under Kugler and Hurley’s adopted framework. 60 They express particular
concern about smart meters that are connected to various smart appliances and devices
like Amazon’s Alexa. 61 The integration of these devices with a smart meter system can
reveal even more about the intimate activities of the home. 62 Yet integrating smart home
devices with smart meters is an inherently voluntary act. Purchasing smart home
devices in the first place is voluntary, and indeed only about a fourth of American
households currently contain any such device. 63 Integrating these devices’ datagathering capabilities with smart meters is also likely to be a voluntary step requiring
conscious action on the part of a homeowner. 64 Data obtained from smart speakers and
other devices integrated with smart meters would accordingly be unprotected by the
Fourth Amendment, despite its especially intimate, detailed, and voluminous nature.
Voluntariness paradigms provide a shaky foundation for smart meter privacy.
Between chances to opt out and the voluntary nature of smart device integration, the
robust Fourth Amendment protections that Kugler and Hurley contemplate may be

See supra note 53.
E.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND
HAPPINESS (2008).
58 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211, 2220 (2018) (noting the ubiquity of cellphones and
characterizing them as indispensable to participation in modern society).
59 See Tokson, supra note 42 (reporting that lower courts generally focus on the automatic and involuntary
nature of data disclosure, rather than the ubiquity of a technology, when applying Carpenter).
60 See Kugler & Hurley, supra note 1, at 487.
61 Kugler & Hurley, supra note 1, at 472 (noting that “these devices can be connected to or integrated with
the home energy management system”).
62 Kugler & Hurley, supra note 1, at 473–74.
63 Micah Singleton, Nearly a Quarter of U.S. Households Own a Smart Speaker, According to Nielsen, THE VERGE,
Sep. 30, 2018, https://www.theverge.com/circuitbreaker/2018/9/30/17914022/smart-speaker-40-percent-ushouseholds-nielsen-amazon-echo-google-home-apple-homepod.
64 See Kugler & Hurley, supra note 1, at 507 (discussing the development of consumer products that will
interact with smart meters, thereby enhancing the value of the smart grid).
56
57
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substantially diminished. 65 In this respect, smart meter data is in good company, joining
numerous other forms of digital data that would go unprotected or underprotected
under a voluntariness approach: ride-sharing data, individual website data, peer-to-peer
file sharing, DNA analysis, smart phone apps including dating and other personal apps,
smart home devices, and more. 66
But an involuntariness requirement is hardly inevitable. Most scholars view
involuntariness not as a requirement but as merely one factor among many examined in
Carpenter. 67 The Court’s discussion of the voluntariness issue in Carpenter was mostly
confined to a single paragraph in a lengthy opinion that largely focused on factors such
as the deeply revealing nature of the surveillance, the amount of data gathered, and the
cost of the surveillance. 68
Voluntariness need not be definitive in future cases. Lower courts applying
Carpenter have sometimes examined the voluntary or inescapable nature of data
disclosure and other times ignored this consideration. 69 Factors such as revealing nature
and amount are generally more prevalent in post-Carpenter decisions. 70 Moreover, some
scholars have argued that voluntariness is a conceptually incoherent standard that
should be minimized by lower courts and ultimately abandoned by the Supreme

See Kugler & Hurley, supra note 1, at 489.
Tokson, supra note 40, at 433–37. See also, e.g., United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2019) (the use
of a messaging app was voluntary and therefore data associated with its use was unprotected); United States
v. Kidd, 394 F. Supp. 3d 357, 358–59, 365–66, (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (voice-over-internet-protocol service was not
ubiquitous or inescapable and therefore was likely not protected by the Fourth Amendment); United States
v. Shipton, No. 0:18-CR-202-PJS-KMM, 2019 WL 5330928, at *14 (D. Minn. Sept. 11, 2019), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 18-CR-0202 (PJS/KMM), 2019 WL 5305573 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2019) (holding
that the government could monitor peer-to-peer file sharing because file sharing was not indispensable to
daily life and required a voluntary action by the user).
67 See Ohm, supra note 43, at 378, 384; Tokson, supra note 48, at 5; Susan Freiwald and Stephen W. Smith, The
Carpenter Chronicle: A Near-Perfect Surveillance, 132 HARV. L. REV. 205, 206 (2018).
68 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216, 2211–12, 2215–19 (2018).
69 See supra note 66; United States v. Howard, No. 1:19-CR-54-WKW, 2019 WL 6048885, at *6 (M.D. Ala. Nov.
15, 2019) (holding that one-day warrantless GPS tracking did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it
was shorter in duration and less revealing than cell phone tracking); United States v. Kelly, 385 F. Supp. 3d
721, 726–27 (E.D. Wis. 2019) (holding that the government could warrantlessly capture video from the
hallway of an apartment building which was not the defendant’s residence because the camera collected
little information and the information captured was not sensitive); United States v. Jenkins, No. 1:18-CR- 181MLB-CMS, 2019 WL 2482171, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2019) (finding that the basic subscriber information
associated with a user’s internet accounts was less revealing and involved far less data than cell phone
tracking, and was therefore not a Fourth Amendment search), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:18CR-00181, 2019 WL 1568154 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 11, 2019); People v. Tafoya, 2019 COA 176, ¶¶ 42–48 (ruling that
video surveillance of the curtilage of a suspect’s home for a three-month period violated the Fourth
Amendment because such monitoring captured a great deal of information over time and could reveal sensitive details about a person’s life). These opinions do not overtly reject the concept of inescapability, but they
do resolve novel Fourth Amendment questions without addressing it.
70 Tokson, supra note 42.
65
66
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Court. 71 In any event, by relying less on the involuntary nature of smart meter disclosure
and more on the revealing nature and amount of data that smart meters collect, Kugler
and Hurley could further strengthen their arguments that such data should receive
Fourth Amendment protection.

CONCLUSION
This Essay has argued that smart meters and the questions they raise can help point
the way toward the future of privacy law. First, the unique characteristics of smart
meters compel judicial and legislative use restrictions as no technology has before.
Second, voluntariness paradigms offer only partial and unstable Fourth Amendment
protection for smart meter users, and these paradigms should be abandoned for broader
and more inclusive approaches. Kugler and Hurley offer an excellent and thorough
analysis of the privacy considerations at stake in the smart meter context. The Energy
Use Privacy Act they propose would substantially promote smart meter privacy against
government and private actors. Ultimately, their illuminating discussion and innovative
solutions will help courts and lawmakers accommodate this important new technology
while preserving residential privacy.

71

Tokson, supra note 40, at 426–33.
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